Coasting Trade in Canada
The marine transportation of
goods and people between two points in Canada, as well as any other marine
activity of a commercial nature in Canadian waters is restricted in Canada to
Canadian vessels. “Coasting trade” refers to activity within Canada, as opposed
to between Canada and another country. Canada has a vested interest in ensuring
marine commercial activity in Canada is as often as possible facilitated by
Canadian ships, in order to stimulate Canadian business generally. While
Canadian ships are preferred, circumstances may require non-Canadian ships to
operate in the Canadian coasting trade. The Coasting
Trade Act, S.C. 1992, c. 31 (the “Act”) sets out the method to ascertain
when that might be permitted. Generally, it is when there is no suitable
Canadian ship available to carry out the activity.
The
Act defines “coasting trade” under s.
2(1) as either
a)
the carriage of goods by ship alone, or by ship and another mode of transport;
b)
the carriage of passengers by ship; or
c)
engaging in any other commercial marine activity by ship; from one place in
Canada or above the continental shelf of Canada, to any other place in Canada
or above the continental shelf, either directly or via a place outside Canada.
With
respect to references to a place above the continental shelf of Canada,
coasting trade only applies to the exploration, exploitation, or transportation
of the mineral or non-living natural resources of the continental shelf.
In
order to be permitted to use a foreign vessel in the coasting trade, one must
apply simultaneously to the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) and the Canadian
Transportation Agency (“CTA”). The CTA is responsible for determining whether a
suitable Canadian ship is available to perform the activity identified in the
application and, in the case of the carriage of passengers, the CTA must also
determine whether Canadian vessels offer adequate, similar passenger services.
During
the application process which includes a notice to Canadian ship owners,
potential Canadian suppliers can make submissions to the CTA opposing the
granting of the license by representing that they have a Canadian ship or ships
that can offer the service and by offering its ship(s) or services. The CTA
decision can be contested. An appeal lies to the Federal Court of Appeal.
What
happens, however, if the foreign ship does not make an application to the CTA? If
a foreign ship does participate in the coasting trade in Canada without a
license, the ship may be found guilty of an offence and is liable on summary
conviction to a fine of up to $50,000 per day the activity occurs. An
enforcement officer (from Transport Canada) may go so far as to require the
owner, master or any other person to produce the official log book or other
ship document that may evidence the offence. The officer may also order the
ship detained.
What
are the steps a Canadian ship owner can take if the foreign ship does not make
an application to the CTA and neither Transport Canada nor the CTA enforce what
is perceived as a coasting trade service? This scenario was recently before the
Federal Court of Canada in McKeil Marine
Limited v. A.G. Canada and Foss Maritime Company 2016 FC 1063. At issue in
the case was whether a decision of the Chief, Marine Policy and Regulatory
Affairs Seaway and Domestic Shipping Policy of Transport Canada made on
February 5th 2016 that the towage of two decommissioned vessels from
British Columbia via the Panama Canal to Nova Scotia, to be dismantled would
not constitute engaging in the coasting trade. Part of the journey, from
British Columbia to Panama, was being done by
American vessels owned by Foss Maritime Company [“Foss”]. Canadian vessels
owned by Atlantic Towing (“Atlantic”) were performing the segment from Panama
to Nova Scotia.
McKeil
Marine Limited (“McKeil”) is a Canadian tug and barge owning company based in
Ontario with operations through the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence Seaway and the
east coast of Canada. It brought an application to the Federal Court for relief
including a declaration that the towage of vessels between British Columbia and
Nova Scotia constituted coasting trade.
The
activity in question had come to the attention of Transport Canada in two ways.
In January 2016, McKeil brought to the attention of Transport Canada that U.S.
flagged ships being used to tow the decommissioned vessels did not have
a license and questioned whether there was a violation of the Act. Initially Atlantic was advised by
Transport Canada that a license may be required. In late January, Transport
Canada informed Atlantic that the operation did not seem to meet the definition
of coasting trade. Transport Canada advised McKeil on February 5th
2016 of their “decision.” Following the receipt of this information, Atlantic
entered into a contract with Foss to tow the vessels and no application was
made to the CTA for a license. Shortly
thereafter, on February 24th 2016 Foss commenced the tow of the
first vessel from British Columbia arriving in Panama on or about March 23,
2016. An Atlantic tug towed the vessel from Panama to Nova Scotia arriving on
April 22, 2016. The second vessel left British Columbia on May 9th,
2016 and arrived in Nova Scotia on June 27th, 2016. The application
by McKeil in the Federal Court was heard on July 13th, 2016. By that
date, the towage of the decommissioned vessels had been completed.
In
the Federal Court McKeil raised two issues:
1. The towage was a “carriage of goods” by a
ship and triggered subsection 2(1)(a) of the Act; and
2. The towage was a commercial marine activity
in Canadian waters contrary to section 2(1)(f) of the Act.
Foss
countered that:
1. The towing of a ship cannot be properly
characterized as the “carriage of goods” by ship;
2. Each towing operation was two tows neither
of which was entirely within Canadian waters and thus not a “marine activity of
a commercial nature in Canadian waters”;
3. McKeil lacked standing to bring the
application because it was not directly affected by the decision of Transport
Canada as required by s. 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act, RSC 1985, c. F-7;
4. McKeil should not be granted public
interest standing to challenge the decision; and
5. Even if McKeil had standing to challenge
the decision of Transport Canada, the issue before the Court was moot because
the towage of the two ships had been completed and the Court ought not to
exercise its discretion to hear the matter.
Justice
Zinn found on the evidence (cross examination transcripts) that McKeil
acknowledged that it was principally concerned with the impact of the decision
in this case to its operations in the Great Lakes. Justice Zinn found that
McKeil provided no evidence demonstrating any direct advantage to it if its
application succeeded or any direct disadvantage if it failed. “Its interest in
the matter at issue, is at best, an indirect one.” Justice Zinn found that
McKeil had no direct standing to bring the application.
Justice
Zinn then dealt with the issue of whether to grant public interest standing to
McKeil. The Supreme Court of Canada in Downtown
Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society v.
Canada [2012] 2 SCR 524 sets out the factors to be considered when
determining whether to grant public interest standing, at para. 2:
…whether the case raises a serious justiciable issue,
whether the party bringing the action has a real stake or a genuine interest in
its outcome and whether, having regard to a number of factors, the proposed
suit is a reasonable and effective means to bring the case to court.
Interestingly
the Court found that the “issue of the interpretation of the meaning of the Act as it applies to the facts in this
case is far from frivolous, and was not brought by a ‘busybody’ litigant. In my
view, there is a serious justiciable issue in this case.” Justice Zinn also
found that he was prepared to find that the subject of the application was
clearly within the business of McKeil and that it had a “real or a genuine
interest in its outcome.” Justice Zinn, however, was not prepared to find for
McKeil on the basis of the third prong in the Downtown test, that is that the proposed suit was a reasonable and
effective means to bring the case to the court. One factor considered was
whether there was a realistic alternative means, which would favour a more
efficient and effective use of judicial resources and would present a context
more suitable for adversarial determination. Justice Zinn found, at paras. 34
and 35:
Given the considerations in granting public interest standing
and primarily relying on the consideration that the present case is not one
closely reflecting McKeil’s real concern, I do not think this is the
appropriate case to grant it public interest standing. In this respect, I agree
with Foss that it is better use of judicial resources to address McKeil’s real
concern which rests in Great Lakes towing if there is a future situation where
that issue can be more effectively raised between the parties that are more
directly opposed.
This finding will not, however, bar McKeil from being
granted public interest standing in the future (when a more appropriate case
arises)…
Justice
Zinn then dealt with the issue of mootness. His Honour held that, even if he
had granted McKeil standing on the application, the matter was moot and he
would not exercise his discretion to hear the matter. The evidence showed that
there was no longer a live controversy as the Foss vessels had completed the
towing operations and the decommissioned ships had arrived in Nova Scotia.
Justice Zinn added, at para. 44:
In the future, if McKeil were to hear of rumours of a US
flagged vessel operating in the Great Lakes without a license and raised
similar concerns to Transport Canada, a judicial review of Transport Canada
decision could be brought on an urgent basis or an application could be made to
the court for an interim injunction.
Justice
Zinn declined to hear the application on its merits.
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