Insurer Owes No Duty of Good Faith to Advise Insured of Limitation Period
In Usanovic v.
Penncorp Life Insurance Company (La Capitale Financial Security Insurance Company), 2017 ONCA 395, the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that an insurer’s duty of good faith did not require it to give notice of the limitation period to its
insured for an action to be brought against it. The Court held that while the
legislatures of some provinces have imposed a statutory
obligation to that effect, there is no such requirement in Ontario. Whether
there should be is a matter that should be left to the legislature.
Background
The claimant Mr. Usanovic
(“Usanovic”) was a self-employed eavestrough installer. In 1999, he bought
an insurance policy from the insurer Penncorp Life
Insurance Company. The policy insured him against disability
arising from accidents. In 2004, he purchased additional coverage for
disability arising from sickness.
In September 2007, Usanovic
fell from a roof and suffered serious injuries. He received disability benefits
until November 2011, when the insurer terminated its payments because he no
longer had a “total disability”, as defined by the policy.
On January 12, 2012, the insurer’s
lawyer wrote to Usanovic explaining that since benefits had been paid for 24
months, he was not entitled to receive further benefits unless he was unable to
engage in any and every occupation for which he was reasonably fit by reason of
his education, training and experience. A review of the medical information on
his file did not support the conclusion that he had a total disability.
Moreover, surveillance undertaken by the insurer was inconsistent with the limitations from which
Usanovic claimed to be suffering.
The lawyer’s letter added,
“If you disagree with this decision, please submit, within sixty days of
receipt of this letter, medical records in support of your claim for total
disability from any occupation for which you are reasonably trained and
educated”.
Usanovic did not provide
new medical records in response to the letter. He claimed in an affidavit that
he had sent a letter to the insurer, protesting the termination of his
benefits. The insurer denied having received that letter.
In cross-examination, Usanovic
admitted that he knew his benefits had been terminated, had received the
lawyer’s letter, had read the policy over, had discussed the matter with his
wife many times and had considered hiring a lawyer, but could not afford to do
so.
In early 2015, Usanovic consulted
counsel, who told him that there was a two-year limitation period regarding his
claim. Usanovic alleged that, had the insurance company told him
about the limitation period when it denied his claim, he would have brought an
action earlier. He commenced this action in April 2015, more than two years
after the termination of his benefits and receipt of the letter from the
insurer’s lawyer.
The Decision of the Motions Judge
The Court of Appeal reviewed the decision of
the judge before whom the original application had been brought. In the court below
Usanovic submitted that the insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing obliged it
to advise its insured of
the applicable limitation period regarding the denial or discontinuance of insurance benefits
and that the two-year limitation period did not begin
to run until the insurer gave
this notice.
The
motion judge rejected this argument. He observed that, “in my view, the
extension of the law proposed by the plaintiff [Usanovic] would represent a
substantial shift in the boundaries of the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing on insurers as they are presently understood” (at
para. 38).
The motion judge’s
core conclusions, at paras. 40-42, were as follows:
It would appear that, at its highest, the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing arguably carries with it a positive obligation on an insurer to inform its insured of the nature of the benefits
available under the policy. There is a marked difference, however, between
imposing on an insurer a
positive obligation to advise with respect to rights and benefits internal to
the policy and the imposition of an obligation to advise with respect to the
application of law external to the policy, such as pursuant to the Limitations Act.
In my view the court should be circumspect in extending the
common law to impose positive obligations of general application on parties,
particularly where the implications of so doing are unknown. The law of insurance is broadly occupied by legislation and
in my view it should be left to the legislature to regulate, if it deems it
necessary and appropriate, the nature and extent of information which must be
given by insurers to their insureds upon denial of benefits, including the
existence and details of applicable limitation periods.
I find that there was no obligation in law on the defendant
to advise the plaintiff of the applicable limitation period in the Limitations Act.
Court of Appeal
Justice
George Strathy, Chief Justice of Ontario, writing for a unanimous panel,
summarized the law in Ontario as follows:
1. Parties to an insurance contract owe each other a duty of utmost good faith;
2. This duty
requires an insurer to deal with claims by its insured in good faith;
3. The duty of
good faith is not the same as a fiduciary duty. In contrast to a fiduciary
duty, the insurer is not obliged to treat the insured’s
interests as paramount. However, the insurer must
give as much consideration to the welfare of the insured as to its own interests. This
requirement is based on the recognition that the insured is typically in a vulnerable position
when making a claim;
4. The scope of
the duty of good faith has not been precisely delineated or definitively
settled. Although the assessment is fact-specific and will depend on the
particular circumstances of each case, courts have recognized some general
requirements of the duty of good faith;
5. The
duty of good faith requires an insurer to
act both promptly and fairly when investigating, assessing and attempting to
resolve claims made by its insureds.
The first part of this duty speaks to the timeliness in
which a claim is processed by the insurer. Although an insurer may
be responsible to pay interest on a claim paid after delay, delay in payment
may nevertheless operate to the disadvantage of an insured.
The insured,
having suffered a loss, will frequently be under financial pressure to settle
the claim as soon as possible in order to redress the situation that underlies
the claim. The duty of good faith obliges the insurer to
act with reasonable promptness during each step of the claims process. Included
in this duty is the obligation to pay a claim in a timely manner when there is
no reasonable basis to contest coverage or to withhold payment.
The duty of good faith also requires an insurer to deal with its insured’s
claim fairly. The duty to act fairly applies both to the manner in which the insurer investigates and assesses the claim
and to the decision whether or not to pay the claim. In making a decision
whether to refuse payment of a claim from its insured, an insurer must
assess the merits of the claim in a balanced and reasonable manner. It must not
deny coverage or delay payment in order to take advantage of the insured’s
economic vulnerability or to gain bargaining leverage in negotiating a
settlement. A decision by an insurer to
refuse payment should be based on a reasonable interpretation of its
obligations under the policy. This duty of fairness, however, does not require
that an insurer necessarily be correct in making a
decision to dispute its obligation to pay a claim. Mere denial of a claim that
ultimately succeeds is not, in itself, an act of bad faith.
Justice Strathy noted that, “in
this case, however, we are asked to do something more than impose
a duty of good faith on insurers to
disclose the contents of the insurance policy.
We are asked to extend the duty of good faith to require an insurer to disclose information outside the policy
– namely, the existence of a limitation period.”
Justice Strathy also noted that some commentators have
suggested that it would be severe and unfair for the insured to be denied benefits
when the insurer was aware of the limitation period, but the insured was not. He also noted
that the British Columbia Court of Appeal has directly addressed this issue and
concluded that the insurer is not obliged to advise the insured of the limitation
period, although some members of the court suggested that it may be advisable
to do so.
The Court noted that while no court has imposed a duty on the insurer to inform the insured of the limitation
period, some legislatures have done so. In British Columbia, a regulation
introduced in 2012 requires the insurer to give written notice to the claimant of the applicable
statutory limitation period when it denies the claim or within a short time
thereafter. There are exceptions for claimants represented by legal counsel and
those making certain types of claims. If the insurer fails to provide the requisite notice, the running of the
limitation period is suspended. Alberta has also adopted specific notice
requirements. Pursuant to a 2012 amendment to the Fair
Practices Regulation an insurer must
give written notice of the applicable limitation period within five business
days of denying a claim. The notice is not required when the insurer is aware the claimant is represented
by counsel and for certain types of claims. If the insurer fails to give that notice, the court
may, on application of the claimant, order that the applicable limitation
period be extended and grant any other remedy that the court considers
appropriate.
Ontario has not
gone as far as Alberta and British Columbia. However, the Insurance
Act was amended in 2012 to require life,
disability and creditors insurers to
include the following statement in the insurance policy
and certificate:
Every action or proceeding against an insurer for the recovery of insurance money payable under the contract is
absolutely barred unless commenced within the time set out in the Limitations Act,
2002.
Justice Strathy concluded that the Ontario legislature might have
gone further than it did, for example, by adopting the approach taken in
Alberta or British Columbia. It presumably chose not to do so and, “in my
respectful view, the court should not impose consumer protection measures on insurers, outside the terms of their
policies, that the legislature has not seen fit to require. A properly crafted
regime, such as those in effect in Alberta and British Columbia, would not only
have to specify the requirement to give notice, but also the consequences of
failing to do so.”
In this well reasoned
decision, Justice Strathy summarized the issue:
The consequences of
the appellant’s [Usanovic’s] proposed expansion of the duty of good faith are
significant. The appellant’s interpretation would effectively judicially
overrule the provisions of the Limitations Act,
2002 by making notice
given by an insurer to an insured the trigger for the limitation period,
rather than discoverability of the underlying claim. This would defeat the
purpose of the statute and bring ambiguity, rather than clarity, to the
process.
The appeal
was dismissed.
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